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resumen
El artículo analiza el concepto de innovación y su
impacto en la teoría social.  En concreto, el trabajo
se centra en la forma en que la innovación requiere
una yuxtaposición y equilibrio de las categorías socio-
lógicas (conocimiento, economía, sociedad)  que con-
figuran su existencia en sus orígenes. La innovación
ejerce el papel de todo y parten de la descripción socio-
lógica de la sociedad tecnocientífica del siglo XXI.
En este sentido, la investigación arroja luz sobre cómo
las descripciones antropológicas de las prácticas aca-
démicas y científicas facilitan procesos innovadores
que no colapsen con sus propios objetos de descrip-
ción. Todo ello sobre la base de un “constructo” con-
creto del cambio social: la organización de la ciencia
e investigación en torno a la producción institucio-
nal de la repetición como forma de innovación.
abstract
This paper explores how the concept of innovation fares
in, and what does it do to, our social theory. In parti-
cular, I am interested in the way the notion of innova-
tion demands the playful juxtaposition and balancing
of the sociological categories (knowledge, economy,
society) that call for its existence in the first place. Inno-
vation plays the role of both part and whole in the socio-
logical description of 21st century technoscientific society.
In its stead, the article provides some glimpses of how
anthropological descriptions of academic and scienti-
fic practices allow for accounts of innovative processes
that do not collapse their own objects of description. I
draw inspiration to this effect from one specific instance
of social change: the organisation of science and rese-
arch around the institutional production of repetition
as a mode of innovation.
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There is a famous passage in Dostoevsky’s novel, Notes from the
Underground, where the main character undergoes a moment of
self-revelation, a revolutionary moment of self-discovery, in which
he realises that the structure of caste society in post-Crimean
War Russia (Dostoevsky is writing in the 1860s) contains crevices
and fractures, fleeting and elusive openings that hint at what a
classless society might look like. The passage in question refers
to a decision taken by the Underground Man to stand up against
an officer in The Nevsky Prospect, the most public of urban spa-
ces in Petersburg. The Underground Man has made a decision not
to step aside, not to budge an inch when walking past the officer
in the street. Our protagonist has realised that the possibility for
a new society evinces in the public character of street life and
has made a decision to keep thus his dignity, to claim his right
to equality, by not retreating an inch as his and the officer’s paths
cross roads.
Marshall Berman, who has commented on this particular scene in
Dostoevsky’s novel, has suggested that the episode dramatizes the
struggle for modernisation in mid-19th century Russia (Berman 1988
[1982]: 219-235). For Berman, the aforementioned passage vividly
exemplifies the rise of a New Man in Petersburg, the coming-into-
light of a hitherto underground man: ‘groups of anonymous and
ordinary people, of people full of weakness and vulnerabilities, torn
by fear and self-doubt and ambivalence, but willing at crucial
moments to go out into the streets and risk their necks to fight
for their rights.’ (Berman 1988 [1982]: 235) However, Berman
cautions against any simplistic reading of Dostoevsky’s analysis
of the (already decaying) feudal structures of Russian society. Dos-
toevsky was hardly a reactionary thinker, and his ideas about human
development and progress stood in no straightforward relationship
with how he thought a society ought to be organised and patter-
ned. For Dostoevsky, there were no social terminal stations that
progress and modernity took us to. Much the contrary: Berman’s
reading of Notes from the Underground lucidly shows how Dosto-
evsky’s idea of progress and change is essentially an adventurous
one, where the values to be embraced are those of fabrication
and movement, of continuous discovery and audacious creation.
The New Society is not a place to be reached by social change,
but an exploration itself – a journey, not a destination.
Dostoevsky’s vision of sociological change as fabrication, as hands-
on social transformation, uses ‘engineering’ as its ideological ins-
piration. According to Berman, for Dostoevsky the ‘primary symbol
of human creativity is not, say, art or philosophy, but enginee-
ring.’ (Berman 1988 [1982]: 242) Engineering is modernity’s ins-
titutional expression of human action and creativity in its most
dynamic form. Engineering is what society does to itself when it
undergoes positive change. Berman puts the implications of this
with his usual elegance:
The activity of engineering, so long as it remains an activity, can
bring man’s creativity to its highest pitch; but as soon as the
builder stops building, and entrenches himself in the things he has
made, the creative energies are frozen, and the palace becomes a
tomb. This suggests a fundamental distinction between different
modes of modernization: modernization as adventure and moder-
nization as routine. (Berman 1988 [1982]: 243)
I have decided to open this brief essay with a reference to Ber-
man’s insightful reading of Dostoevsky’s analysis of the social and
technological conditions of modern society because of the sim-
plicity and elegance, I think, with which it brings to the fore and
illuminates certain aspects of our contemporary concern with the
knowledge economy and with what Helga Nowotny has called the
‘quest for innovation’ (Nowotny 2007). For Berman – and for Dos-
toevsky – it is clear that the conditions of modernity stand in no
direct relationship to progress or, indeed, to social change at lar-
ge. Modernity is not about social change, neither is it about tech-
nological change. Indeed, there are modes of change (for instan-
ce, philosophical arguments) that do not bring us any closer to
social progress. Dostoevsky thinks that only a society built on a
particular transformative orientation will achieve modernity. Said
differently, ‘society’, ‘technology’ and ‘change’ are not proportio-
nate objects for one another. There is no correlative function bet-
ween these terms that will procure the modern condition. And whilst
it was adventure that filled the void of correlation for Dostoevsky,
we can argue, with Nowotny, that today it is innovation that plays
the part of social change. In other words, innovation is to the kno-
wledge economy what adventure was to 19th century modernism.
This may all sound rather pedestrian to us, but it is surprising
how often science-policy analysts forget that most simple and
yet significant of sociological distinctions, between what we say
a sociological object is and how we put it to work sociologi-
cally. In the case above we can see that the way the ideal of moder-
nity is put to work sociologically differs from the terms (engine-
ering, social structure and human progress and dignity) which
are said to constitute it. Modernity is said to happen if, and only
if, these terms are put to work together under the sociological spell
of adventure.
This essay is concerned with a similar type of sociological spell –
the sociological enchantment of innovation. In particular, I am
interested in the shape and forms given to ‘knowledge’, ‘economy’
and ‘science’ when forced to work – when held together in a corre-
lative function – under the mantra of innovation. In order to do
this, I break up my argument into three parts. First, I provide a
sketch of the terms in which the institutional culture of innova-
tion, and the governance of knowledge at large, is largely imagi-
ned today. Central to this imagination are the notions of collabo-
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ration, interdisciplinarity, social trust and ethics. Next, I provide
glimpses of recent fieldwork carried out by anthropologists wor-
king on scientific and research institutions, who are attempting
to advance ways of thinking beyond the correlative circularity of
the knowledge economy. To conclude, I draw briefly on my own
work to suggest that there are good grounds for re-describing ‘inno-
vation’ in terms of an economy of repetition. Repetition is the
form that the cultural economy of innovation takes when the pro-
duction of knowledge is at stake.
1 . T h e  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  o f  i n n o v a t i o n
Over the past ten years there has been a shift in the way Euro-
American societies conceptualise the place of science and techno-
logy in the political landscape. As Nico Stehr has put it, we have
moved from thinking about the ‘politics of knowledge’ to recogni-
sing a particular form of ‘knowledge politics’ (Stehr 2003: 643). The
general claim here is that scientific knowledge has turned into an
object in need of governance (Fuller 2000) – that calls for a model
where the political structures of science are value free and trans-
parent and all that is required from scientists and legislators is to
embrace structures of governance that consolidate and replicate
an idea of science as a democratic good in itself. There are echoes
here of the model of the ‘open society’ (Popper 1945) and the model,
too, of the ‘republic of science’ (Polanyi 1962), in which science and
scientific knowledge are imagined as political objects that can be
‘well-ordered’ (Kitcher 2001). And against this political background,
transparency, trust and social ethics emerge as the central regula-
tory mechanisms of the culture of science in the new knowledge
economy (Corsín Jiménez 2005; O’Neill 2002b; Strathern 2000).
The discussion around the ‘governance of science’ has sparked in
turn a lively debate about the entanglements of science in diffe-
rent national traditions of political economy (Jasanoff 2007); the
economics of knowledge and, in particular, the public or commu-
nal qualities of knowledge (David 2000; Foray 2006; Stiglitz 1999);
and the institutional cultures of research environments, which have
undergone important changes in order to help promote a type of
science that is interdisciplinary, society-oriented, evidence-based
and politically sensitive. We have entered thus, so the argument
goes, a new historical phase in the conditions of production of
science, one which has come to be known as Mode-2 Science
(Nowotny et al. 2001).
Two of the most significant discursive regimes shaping the new
political culture of innovation have been ‘collaboration’ and ‘public
value’ (Nowotny 2005; Strathern 2004). Central to both develop-
ments is the idea that innovative science is produced in partners-
hip and association with ‘society’ – that science is innovative inso-
far as its production is mediated and informed by the intermedia-
tion and interventions of non-scientific actors, such as civil asso-
ciations, NGOs, patients groups or so-called ‘third sector’ agen-
cies (Irwin & Wynne 1996; Wilsdon et al. 2005). The idea here is
to expand the democratic constitution of science in order to address
central questions of political ethics over the distribution of rights,
justice and fairness in the new economy of knowledge (Irwin &
Michael 2003) – to develop, that is, a new ‘epistemic pluralism’
that engages scientific experts and lay persons on equal terms
(Maranta et al. 2003). As Dominic Pestre has recently put it, in a
subtly cynical tone, ‘because there are no longer any real con-
flicts of interest of war, and because we no longer have to worry
about the redistribution of goods (the free market being the best
solution) – the state can fade away and at last allow civil society
to auto-organize freely, as it sees fit.’ (Pestre 2005: 41).
2 . T h e  c o r r e l a t i v e  c i r c u l a r i t y  
o f  t h e  k n o w l e d g e  e c o n o m y
As we have seen above, a particular notion of ‘society’ has made
an important reappearance in the conception of science as an epis-
temological and practical endeavour. Whatever ‘science’ is, and
whatever its practice entails, we need to open-up our ideas of scien-
tific production to considerations of political economy and social
ethics. This is why Philip Mirowski has recently spoken of the
need to develop a programme for rethinking the political economy
of epistemology (Mirowski 2004) – why the production of Science
is today inflected by questions of participation, ownership and
appropriation that concern us all.
Whilst the call to open-up scientific activities and programmes to
‘society’ – the call for developing a new sociological role for scien-
ce – are no doubt necessary and relevant, there are also impor-
tant ways in which the science:society::technology:politics equa-
tions are virtual and problematic. The correlation between Science
and Society is a political fiction as likely to produce epistemolo-
gical deformations as our previous conception of science as an ivory
tower populated by reclusive experts. It remains unclear, for ins-
tance, how ‘public understanding of science’ programmes, scien-
tific citizenship parliaments or participatory processes (e.g. the
participation of lay people in scientific experiments) can help brid-
ge the divide between scientists and the so-called public domain.
In all these cases Society is still imagined as a thing ‘out there’,
a whole that needs to be disassembled into a body of partial and
representative interlocutors for Science. This part-to-whole socio-
logical imagination explains why the political description of the
knowledge economy indulges in correlative circularities – becau-
se, in this context, knowledge/society/economy work as propor-
tionate objects (now part, now whole) for one another.  
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A similar argument can be applied to the political use of the con-
cept of ‘innovation’. Helga Nowotny has recently shown how the
concept of innovation has emerged at the turn of the 21st cen-
tury as a cultural category whose purpose is to make sense of,
and provide lubrication for, a novel balance of forces between our
(Western) conception of the technological present and the uncer-
tain light cast on our plural and risky futures. As she puts it,
‘innovation embraces the uncertainties inherent in the future’
(Nowotny 2007: 4) Innovation, for Nowotny, is how modern tech-
nological society describes itself when caught up in the self-cir-
culatory predicament of not knowing what the future will bring.
We innovate because there is nothing left for the knowledge society
to do at this stage in our historical predicament (Nowotny 2007:
14-15). The point, then, is that ‘innovation’ fares both as a part
and a whole in our sociological descriptions of the knowledge
society: what we have to do to become what we (say we) are.
For all of the above, rather than an improved sociological unders-
tanding of knowledge/society relations, or indeed of the place of
innovation in the cultural economy of science, what we need is a
better appreciation of how and when science becomes producti-
vely public. We need to understand the social and political concerns
that scientists deploy in their everyday work as scientists – how
they produce society at the same time as they produce science.
As Brian Wynne and his associates have put it, ‘We need… to
shift from noun to adjective, by asking not only: what is the public
value of science? But also, what would public value science look
like?’ (Wilsdon et al. 2005: 29)
Anthropologists have long been interested in the conditions of pro-
duction of science as a practical, everyday activity – what scien-
tists and researchers ‘do’ when they do knowledge. One of the
earliest and most fascinating accounts of collaborative science, for
instance, is Georgina Born’s monograph on the collaborative work
carried out by computer scientists and musicians at the Institut de
Recherche et de Coordination Acoustique/Musique, IRCAM, in Paris
in the 1980s (Born 1995). Because my space here is sparse, I can
hardly do justice to Born’s extraordinary ethnography. I shall narrow
my remit here to a vignette on the difficulties that behold any effort
at turning ‘interdisciplinarity’ into an artefact of knowledge. To
caricature the point: there is too much unacknowledged knowled-
ge in knowing when collaboration becomes knowledge.
IRCAM opened in 1977 as a computer music research and produc-
tion institute aimed, under the founding directorship of Pierre Bou-
lez, at becoming the world’s leading ‘progressive’ contemporary
music institution, an organisation which would help renovate and
canonize Boulez’s own modernist understanding of musical kno-
wledge. From its inception, interdisciplinarity (or collaboration, as
it was called then) figured centrally in IRCAM’s organizational struc-
ture. It was Boulez’s ambition to bring the collaboration between
computer scientists and musicians to bear on the research of musi-
c’s universal structures: to identity music’s basic rules and patterns,
and to develop the tools that would allow attuning these struc-
tures to the perceptual and psychoacoustic profiles of listeners.
Musicians and computer scientists worked together in developing
hardware and software tools that would facilitate exploring and
stretching the limits of these musical structures, and that would
further enable them to synthesize new sounds for compositional
purposes.
An example of the complex interfolding of ideas, images and con-
cepts that characterises the weaving together of different tradi-
tions of knowledge is provided by Born on account of the des-
criptions that musicians made of their own compositions. Born
observes how musicians’ aesthetic imagination was in the most part
populated by scientific images and concepts. Of these, biological
analogies played a prominent role in musicians’ visualization of the
structure of musical knowledge. They imported biological models
on functions of growth generation, such as the growth of a leaf,
or the unity of micro and macro forms, such as the structural homo-
logy between an apple and the tree it hangs from, to make sense
of the generative growth of their own musical compositions (Born
1995: 166-167). One researcher used ‘scientific analogies from
genetics and morphogenesis as metaphors for musical forms, and
also [made] reference to Thom’s mathematics and catastrophe the-
ory.’ (Born 1995: 203) The point is worth pressing because it shows
how knowledge is rarely the product of linear progressions, nor of
simple disciplinary exchanges: musicians resorted to a scientific
vocabulary to make sense of their own musical understanding.
The point may be rehearsed by saying that musicians’ knowledge
of music was scientific.
There is a lesson to learn here about the cultural organisation of
scientific practice that leads to innovative research. On the one
hand, it is important to note that the kind of innovative work deve-
loped by scientists and musicians at IRCAM demands first a heavy
investment in cultural self-knowledge: musicians and scientists can
only make their collaboration fruitful if they understand each othe-
r’s cultural imaginations; if scientists understand the science that
animates musician’s comprehension of their own work. This entails
no simple exchange of perspectives. It is not enough for scientists
and musicians to start working together; not enough for two dis-
ciplines to interact with one another. Born’s ethnography illustra-
tes the point when it describes the despair expressed by computer
scientists at musicians’ resistance to delivering commercial outputs
(Born 1995: 213-217). Musicians and scientists held different mea-
sures and notions of when the process and production of knowled-
ge should be brought to a halt, when it should be turned into a com-
mercial or technological application, or why it should (not) be
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allowed to keep flowing, to develop further and produce new ana-
logies and extensions. They each held different conceptions of
how knowledge grows, what informs and nurtures the pro-tensions
and retentions of knowledge – the internal and external oscillations
that make knowledge develop from within and exteriorise itself.
We can see why a definition of the work of scientists as ‘interdis-
ciplinary’ or collaborative would in this case seriously fail to cap-
ture the complex movements of knowledge in and out of itself.
In place of interdisciplinarity, I shall call the movement that musi-
cal knowledge effects in Born’s description of how musicians’ con-
ceive their own learning process, ‘reversibility’. This is a case of
knowledge moving in and out of its own analogical descriptions;
of knowledge turning inside out (and thus reversing itself) as it
tries to grasp and understand its own condition. Another way of
illustrating the way the image of reversibility works is to say that
‘knowledge’ spirals unto itself, that it grows by interiorising and
externalising, in a double movement, its own process of coming-
into-being.
3 . E c o n o m i e s  o f  r e p e t i t i o n
Unlike other descriptions of how the production of knowledge takes
place, the image of reversibility attends to knowledge’s own self-
displacements. In his account of how the people working at Cetus
Corporation came to discover PCR, Paul Rabinow speaks of the work
of scientists in terms of ‘bricolage’: the organisation and promo-
tion of an open, collaborative environment that enabled scien-
tists to take risks in the organisation of production; to embrace
changes of direction and level, to look out for non-identical repli-
cations and multiplying modifications. In other words, scientists
were encouraged to work in an environment that allowed the re-
contextualisation of de-contextualisations and enabled, thus, inven-
tion (Rabinow 1996: 169)
Like Rabinow’s, the portrayal of innovative science as a combina-
torial and emergent process pervades the literature on science stu-
dies, and is indeed at the heart of recent programmes promoting
the institutional organisation of science in terms of interdiscipli-
nary. As I have suggested above, however, I believe there is a
case for paying attention not to science’s exo-applications, its
moves and directions outwards (towards other disciplines, other
trades, other epistemological practices), but to focus instead on
the processes through which scientific practices become themsel-
ves; to attend, that is, to science’s own internal displacements,
to its reversible movements.
Paying close attention to how science becomes its own requires,
no doubt, a keen eye for repetitive and meticulous practices. For
all science is built, in the last instance, upon an institutional
economy of repetition: of tests and trials that are repeated time
and again; of times and spaces that are always deployed and dis-
played in identical fashion; of scientists that repeat other scien-
tists experiments, to build upon them, to prove them wrong, to
bring their own science forward in a new direction.
I would like, in this sense, to provide a brief description of two dis-
tinct economies of repetition that I have recently been researching.
This work builds on two periods of fieldwork where I have been
studying and documenting what people do when they ‘do’ and mana-
ge knowledge. Last year I spent just over twelve months (June
2006-September 2007) doing fieldwork among philologists and his-
torians of science at Spain’s National Research Council (Consejo
Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Spain’s equivalent to Fran-
ce’s CNRS). In September 2007 I moved to Buenos Aires, invited
by an international consultancy company to join a team of mana-
gement consultants to work on designing the ‘knowledge envi-
ronment’ (i.e. to design a new building) for one of the world’s
leading oil companies.
Whilst I believe that the production of knowledge at both CSIC and
the oil company demanded the setting up of an economy of repe-
tition, the way in which ‘repetition’ was deployed and effected in
each setting varied significantly. I distinguish two modes of repe-
tition in this respect: ‘whirlpools’, at work in the oil company;
and ‘reversibles’, at work in CSIC. 
We have already encountered an example of reversibility in Born’s
account of musicians’ conception of their own musical knowled-
ge. I do not have the space here to provide a full account of how
reversibility manifested itself in the work of historians of science
and philologists. Briefly, let it be said that reversibility provides
an institutional vehicle for scholarly reflexivity: a means for aca-
demics to situate culturally and socially their own productive acti-
vities. An economy of reversible repetitions describes a situation
where claims to knowledge demand the visibility of its produc-
tion; that is, where knowledge and scholarship (i.e. laboured kno-
wledge) re-verse upon each other. 
As for an economy of whirlpool repetitions, this is characterised
by the organisation of production around the spiralling-up of novel
arrangements and proposals. This is certainly the case of the work
I have done among management consultants in Buenos Aires, whe-
re our programme for a self-declared ‘innovative’ management
culture crops up at every juncture, in every meeting, in every docu-
ment and conversation. I would almost caricature my work as a
‘knowledge manager’ as simply that of someone who repeats, time
and again, the very same word (innovation) and the very same mes-
sage. For example, for just under three months I had 32 meetings
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with senior board managers, where I rolled out and talked over
the same Power Point presentation; paused, explained and elabo-
rated on the same points; and cross-referenced each meeting to
previous meetings, assuaging board members that what they were
being told had been heard and approved by other board members
in previous meetings. Moreover, the Power Point presentation itself
took one month and seven people to prepare. We produced over
ten versions of the same presentation, making changes so subtle
and nuanced that ultimately no one except ourselves were capa-
ble of identifying - and which certainly went unnoticed to the board
members themselves, who were unfamiliar with the document.
We may therefore say that in a whirlpool economy the claims to
knowledge demand the invisibility of its production, because in
this context knowledge is seen to grow the larger the vacuum around
its conditions of production.
To conclude, in this paper I have delineated the cultural economy
of innovation that characterises our modern technoscientific society.
I have suggested that our sociological analyses of such an eco-
nomy often do little more than reorganise its terms of descrip-
tion: to make science and innovation the outcome of a proportio-
nal play between society, economy and knowledge. For this reason,
I have hoped to show how anthropological description can con-
tribute to documenting how science organises and produces itself
from within. This has given me the chance to briefly present a model
of the organisation and production of managerial and scientific
knowledge in terms of an economy of repetition. Repetition is
the name I give to the cultural economy of innovation in modern
societies. Pressed to describe how innovation happens, or what
its conditions of production are, my recommendation, then, is that
we aim to identify not big ideas or big scientists, but to outline
the conditions of investment that will allow for institutional repe-
titions to take place.
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